Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 16 | Issue 4

Article 2

2008

The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical
Leave Act: Gender-Neutral Versus Gender-Equal
Deborah J. Anthony

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law
Commons
Recommended Citation
Anthony, Deborah J. "The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Gender-Neutral Versus Gender-Equal." American
University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law. 16, no. 4 (2008): 459-501.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Anthony: The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Gender-Neut

THE HIDDEN HARMS OF THE FAMILY
AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT:
GENDER-NEUTRAL VERSUS GENDEREQUAL
DEBORAH J. ANTHONY*
I. Introduction ...........................................................................................460
II. History of Family Leave Policy for Women........................................461
A. Gender Discrimination in Employment .....................................462
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ....................................................464
C. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act ...........................................465
III. Passage and Implementation of the Family and Medical Leave
Act.......................................................................................................468
A. History, Debates, and Passage of the FMLA .............................469
B. Legal Requirements and Provisions of the FMLA.....................474
C. Implementation of the FMLA: Harm Based on Gender,
Race, and Class .........................................................................474
D. Expanding the FMLA ................................................................481
IV. Feminist Analysis ...............................................................................487
A. Implications of the Liberal Approach to Gender Equality........488
B. Solutions....................................................................................498
V. Conclusion ...........................................................................................500

*
Deborah J. Anthony holds a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and
an M.A. in Government from the University of Texas at Austin. She practiced poverty
law in Minnesota before becoming a professor of legal studies at the University of
Illinois at Springfield.

459

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2008

1

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 2

460

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:4

I. INTRODUCTION
Since colonial times, American women have been clamoring for equality
and justice in a society whose foundations are purportedly based on
precisely those principles. With the reality of women’s lives so divergent
from these fundamentally revered ideals, many activists devoted their lives
to attempting to gain legal rights equal to those that men enjoyed. Early
philosophers, such as John Stuart Mill, pioneered new arguments for
suffrage and rights for women, and many of these ideas were incorporated
into efforts by American women toward rights attainment. A key claim in
these arguments was often that because gender is a social construct there is
no inherent reason to relegate either gender to an inferior status.1 Other
arguments for equality included fairness and justice, regardless of whether
gender differences were inherent or constructed.2
These historical approaches have typically been liberal in their attempts
to rectify the ubiquitous gender problem. Women’s rights activists have
focused on ideals of personal autonomy, individuality, and identity, and
have lobbied the governing structure to codify these and other rights to
guarantee their extension to all intended beneficiaries. To the extent that
these measures fell short of their highest goals, more laws and better
enforcement are the proffered answers. Thus, ever since women attained
the right to vote in 1920 and then realized that true equality still eluded
them, they have worked to change other laws and policies that served to
oppress their gender. Women have succeeded in obtaining the passage of
many measures aimed at equalizing their status and minimizing or
eliminating the difference in legal treatment between women and men.
The Family and Medical Leave Act3 (FMLA) is one such example of a
liberal effort to gain legal rights that improve the status of a particular
group. In this case, the law is gender-neutral, focusing on facial equality,
and was enacted to provide job protection for people who must take leave
from work for medical reasons including maternity leave and family or
personal illness. This article analyzes the impetus for the law’s passage
and investigates related gender issues, including whether a purpose of the
Act was to address gender inequality in the workforce, and the extent to

1. See JOHN STUART MILL, The Subjection of Women, in ON LIBERTY AND THE
SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 133, 133 (Alan Ryan ed., Penguin Books 2006) (1869)
(arguing that the legal subordination of one sex to the other is wrong and society should
replace this view with one of equality).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 516, 532, 541-45 (1996)
(observing that a law is incompatible with equal protection when it “denies to women,
simply because they are women, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire,
achieve, participate in and contribute to society . . . .”).
3. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified in part at 29 U.S.C. §§ 26012654 (2000)).
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which it has been successful in that aim.
Some groups, especially employers, were opposed to passing the FMLA,
and an analysis of the opposition arguments is relevant.4 The law has
serious limitations, and those limitations may disproportionately affect
women, especially middle- and low-income women.5 This paper addresses
some of the harms that women in particular suffer as a result of the FMLA,
why there is such gendered harm from a gender-neutral law, and how the
potential remedies to the problem might play out according to liberal
theory. A feminist theoretical approach is utilized to that end, and several
prominent scholars are referenced to support the analysis. Each theorist
presents a different take on how gender equality should be conceived and
approached, and how close our current legal framework can take us to the
desired goal. Each analysis will be applied to the FMLA and the problems
surrounding it to determine what solutions would be viable in the effort to
incorporate women fully into working society so that they may have truly
meaningful lives as mothers and caregivers without being forced to
sacrifice their status and position in public life.
II. HISTORY OF FAMILY LEAVE POLICY FOR WOMEN
The questions of family leave, and how law and social policy should
treat women in the workforce, have sustained a history of intense conflict
in the United States. There has existed extensive debate concerning who
should be responsible for issues relating to family and caregiving. With the
private realm considered beyond the reach of state intervention, the liberal
tradition has evinced a sharp distinction between what is considered
“public” (work, politics, and law) and that which is “private” (home and
family). Thus, all family matters, including parenting, caregiving, and how
to balance those matters with work obligations, have typically been left off
the public radar and are up to individual families to work out amongst
themselves. Any inequality extant in the private sphere is likewise of no
concern to the state, nor is the term “justice” applicable there.6 This is why

4. See S. REP. NO. 103-3, pt. 9, at 49 (1993) (minority views) (fearing that passage
of the FMLA would force employers to reduce voluntary benefits because of the
excessive costs of mandated benefits under the legislation, and would excessively
burden small and mid-sized businesses).
5. See Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 39 (2007) (noting that, at least under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, courts could still cover lower-income workers through the use of
disparate impact theory, whereas courts do not have the same flexibility to “extend
coverage” to lower-income workers disproportionately excluded by the FMLA
exemptions).
6. See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 26 (1989)
(arguing that the division of labor in a hierarchical, gender-structured family is unfair
and unequal in the context of general standards of justice).
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we have taken measures to eliminate gender discrimination in public
situations but have taken no similar steps to address gender injustice in the
family. The former is fair game for intervention; the latter is not.
Catharine MacKinnon claims that the “doctrine of privacy has become the
triumph of the state’s abdication of women in the name of freedom and
self-determination.”7 However, there is no clear, inherent reason why this
distinction is necessary; it is simply how the liberal political tradition has
developed, and therefore now constitutes the central values that Americans
hold dear. The events preceding the enactment of the FMLA shed
important light on how the need for a family leave policy developed and
was perceived with respect to “private” notions of family and care.
A. Gender Discrimination in Employment
While historically there existed rampant discrimination against women
in private employment, such discrimination was often also a function of
state-sponsored gender discrimination in the legal realm. A variety of laws
regulated women’s employment, and they were typically upheld when
challenged in court. State laws enforced a variety of regulations, including
limiting the types of positions women could hold, restricting the number of
hours women could work,8 prohibiting overtime and evening work,9
limiting the amount of weight that women could lift,10 and requiring rest
periods.11 Women were also prevented outright from professions including
law and bartending; such restrictions were upheld by the Supreme Court.12
7. Catharine MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1311 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908) (upholding an Oregon
law restricting the number of hours women could work in laundry facilities to ten hours
per day, and rationalizing that the law is a valid exercise of the state’s police power to
protect the health and well-being of working women).
9. See, e.g., People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 108 N.E. 639, 641 (N.Y. 1915)
(affirming a New York law prohibiting women from working before six o’clock in the
morning and after ten o’clock in the evening, and stating that this law was a valid
exercise of the state’s police power to protect the health of women, their offspring, and
society in general).
10. See, e.g., Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)
(concluding that a company may restrict women from lifting a certain amount of
weight under a bona fide qualification exception to the Civil Rights Act, which
prohibits discrimination in employment practices unless the company can show that all
or substantially all women would not be able to perform the task safely).
11. See, e.g., Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994, 998-99 (S.D. Cal. 1972)
(striking a California state law that required rest periods only for female employees
because it violated the Civil Rights Act).
12. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (upholding as a valid exercise
of the state’s legislative power a Michigan statute prohibiting females from bartending
if neither their husband nor father owned the bar); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130,
142 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (validating the denial of a license to practice law
to a female plaintiff because the granting of license to practice law in a state’s courts is
properly controlled by that state, and given the “peculiar characteristics, destiny, and
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In this way, substantial limits were placed on female workers while few
were placed on men, causing women to be less desirable employees who
were more likely to stay at home and fulfill their domestic duties as wives
and mothers.13
When they did venture into the workforce, they could not venture too far
because they were required to remain in the more acceptable “feminine”
positions.14 In 1908, the Supreme Court noted that nineteen states had laws
limiting the hours women could work.15 The Court declared that “a proper
discharge of [a woman’s] maternal functions—having in view not merely
her own health, but the well-being of the race—justif[ies] legislation to
protect her from the greed as well as the passion of man.”16 Until 1969,
every state had some kind of labor legislation that restricted only women,17
and until 1971, the Supreme Court upheld such legal sanctions on
women.18 Therefore, as women entered the workforce in increasing
numbers throughout the twentieth century, they were met with resistance
and resentment.
Moreover, before the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, ways to
make employment more accessible to women were very low on the public
radar. Leave policies were rare and limited, despite becoming more
common in the 1960s and 70s. The problem of individual supervisors
using their discretion to grant leave in a way that resulted in unequal
treatment helped prompt Congress to pass the federal Family and Medical
Leave Act in 1993.19

mission of woman,” Illinois was within its power to exclude women from being
lawyers).
13. See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) (opining that women are
not fit for civil life and that their natural role is in the domestic sphere).
14. See Joan Kennedy Taylor, Protective Labor Legislation, in FREEDOM,
FEMINISM, AND THE STATE 267, 268-70 (Wendy McElroy ed., 1982) (theorizing that
protective labor legislation served to prevent women from entering higher-paying male
jobs); Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (asserting that although women had by this time
ventured into the workforce, they did not have rights or privileges guaranteed by the
Constitution to engage in jobs that had special qualifications or responsibilities).
15. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 n.1 (1908).
16. Id. at 423.
17. See JUDITH A. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO
WOMEN’S LABOR LEGISLATION 4 (1978) (noting that in 1969 the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ruled that the Civil Rights Act superseded conflicting
protective labor laws for women).
18. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (holding, by unanimous vote, that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to distinctions
based on sex).
19. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 732 (2003) (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 2, at 10-11 (1993)) (noting that the discretionary nature of granting
family leave, despite facially neutral state laws and policies, gave rise to sex
discrimination).
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B. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
Early claims of women vying for employment equality and opportunity
dealt with the issue of pregnancy discrimination. Because women were
frequently denied employment, fired, or refused promotions due to
pregnancy, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 included women as a class
protected from discrimination.20 In the early cases brought under the Civil
Rights Act, plaintiffs claimed that discrimination based on pregnancy
amounted to illegal discrimination against women.21 They argued that
because only women become pregnant and because the type of harm that
affected pregnant women could never befall a man, laws and policies were
discriminatory if they did not provide exemptions or protection for
pregnant women. Women began suing their employers under Title VII,
claiming that they were being subjected to unlawful gender discrimination.
These cases set the stage for the pursuit of liberal equality for women under
our current legal and political framework.
However, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court
effectively forestalled any further attempts to claim that pregnancy
discrimination constituted gender discrimination under Title VII.22
Although the employer had a disability plan that explicitly excluded
pregnancy from its coverage, the Court held that such a practice was not
sex discrimination under Title VII because the disparate treatment was not
actually gender-based.23 The Court held that the distinction was not
between women and men, but rather pregnant and non-pregnant persons,
which included both women and men.24 Since men cannot become
pregnant, and not all women will become pregnant, the Court upheld the
policy, concluding that any policy singling out pregnancy is not
discriminatory because women and men are not similarly situated.25 This
type of reasoning represents an intentional self-delusion as to both
biological and social reality, manifested in a requirement that

20. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1964) (prohibiting
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). But see
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (amending Title VII to cover
gender-based employment discrimination and defining employment discrimination
based on sex as unequal or negative treatment directed toward women because of
pregnancy, childbirth, or other gender-related medical conditions).
21. See, e.g., Somers v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 464 F. Supp. 900, 903 (S.D. Tex.
1979) (finding that the school district required only pregnant female employees to take
sick leave without pay, which constituted unlawful discrimination based on sex).
22. 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (holding that the defendant’s benefit plan did not
violate Title VII because there was no indication that the employer’s lack of an
inclusive benefit plan was a pretext for discriminating against women).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 134-35.
25. Id. at 125, 134-36.
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discrimination cannot take place unless similarly situated groups are treated
differently.26
Clearly the anti-discrimination provisions provided to women in Title
VII were not enough to achieve meaningful employment equality. With
respect to family leave issues, the law only mandated equality between
genders and that was interpreted to mean that a lack of family leave was
perfectly acceptable. Because these policies—or a lack thereof—ostensibly
treated both genders equally, there is no Title VII violation, irrespective of
whether one gender was harmed more than the other by the policy. Indeed,
Congress found that “[t]wo-thirds of the nonprofessional caregivers for
older, chronically ill, or disabled persons are working women,”27 which
means that far more working women than men would be excluded by the
absence of a family leave policy.28 Yet there was no legal violation
involved here. Thus, it became obvious that something more than Title VII
would be necessary to respond to the history of gender discrimination in
employment.
C. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
In 1978, Congress quickly picked up on this issue and reacted to the
Gilbert decision’s implications for gender equality in employment by
passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) as an amendment to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.29 The new law stated:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions, and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employmentrelated purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be
interpreted to permit otherwise . . . .30
26. See MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 1286-87 (chastising the way the courts and
the public have construed the “similarly situated” requirement under Title VII to mean
that women can only be treated as equal to men to the extent that they are not women);
see also F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (“[T]he
classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”).
27. S. REP. NO. 103-3, at Part II (1993); see also H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 1, at 24
(1993).
28. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003) (holding
that the Family and Medical Leave Act was an appropriate means of correcting the
problems caused by the stereotypical stigmas attached to women taking leave because
of pregnancy and childbirth, and that the new across-the-board policy will prevent
businesses from seeing women as an inordinate drain).
29. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978).
30. Id.
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As a result, pregnancy discrimination now falls squarely within the
purview of sex discrimination law, and women who are denied
employment opportunities as a result of pregnancy may sue their employer
for such actions.
However, the result of this new law has also provided leverage for men
to claim discrimination when pregnancy has been at issue. In effect, men
have claimed that providing more benefits for pregnancy-related issues
than for other disabilities has constituted gender discrimination against
men. For example, in California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra,
a pregnant worker’s employer claimed that California’s law requiring that
pregnant employees be provided with leave and reinstatement was
discriminatory because men did not enjoy similar benefits for other types of
disabilities (although neither did women).31 Such “special treatment” for
women, the argument went, amounted to discrimination against men on the
basis of pregnancy, which is prohibited by the PDA. By a vote of six to
three, the Supreme Court rejected this claim and opted to uphold
California’s pregnancy law, reasoning that the PDA constituted a floor of
protection for pregnant employees beneath which employers could not fall,
rather than a ceiling limiting how far they could reach.32 The Court cited
the comments of Senator Williams, the sponsor of the PDA who stated
“[t]he entire thrust . . . behind this legislation is to guarantee women the
basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without
denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family life.”33
In the absence of the PDA, one wonders if the Guerra Court would have
adopted the same “similarly situated” requirement that it relied upon in
Gilbert, claiming that the California law did not discriminate against men
per se, but merely non-pregnant persons.34
Despite enactment of the PDA, the law left much to be desired in the
realm of employment equality for women. Although it prohibited
employers from treating pregnancy any worse than a disability, the law did
not require employers to provide any benefits to pregnant women that they
did not already provide to other disabled employees. In other words, if
benefits and leave are not provided as a matter of course, then pregnant
31. See 479 U.S. 272, 290 (1987) (holding that a California statute that required
pregnancy leave and reinstatement for women did not violate Title VII because it was
narrowly drawn only to cover the period of actual physical disability resulting from
pregnancy and did not reflect archaic or stereotypical notions about pregnancy and
pregnant workers).
32. See id. at 285-86 (asserting that in passing the PDA, while Congress had before
it an abundance of evidence showing discrimination against pregnancy, the legislative
history lacks discussion concerning preferential treatment for pregnancy; therefore,
Congress merely intended the PDA to end discrimination against pregnant workers).
33. Id. at 289 (citing 123 Cong. Rec. 29658 (1977)).
34. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134-35 (1976).
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women are as bad off as everyone else. In 1987, for example, a Missouri
law stated that anyone who leaves work for reasons not connected to work
shall be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.35 In Wimberly
v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission, a woman was not reinstated
when she tried to return to work after taking a pregnancy leave from J.C.
Penney.36
She applied for unemployment compensation, but her
application was denied because the Division of Employment Security
determined that she took leave for reasons not connected to work.37 Suing
under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), a federal law mirroring
the PDA’s anti-discrimination provisions regarding pregnancy,38 the
plaintiff argued that the denial of benefits was based on her pregnancy.39
The Supreme Court ruled against her, reasoning that Missouri’s law did not
discriminate on the basis of pregnancy because it applied to all medical
conditions.40 The only intent of the FUTA, the Court said, was to ensure
equality of treatment—even if that “equality” means that women who
become pregnant may be harmed, while men will not.41 The Court held
that neutral criteria are acceptable, even if they result in a denial of benefits
to pregnant women.42 Thus, what the Court and Missouri considered to be
“preferential treatment” was not required by the FUTA.43
The application of the PDA and analogous statutes to situations
involving pregnant women made it clear that the results of the Act still fell
far short of gender equality in employment. Since benefits for pregnant
workers were only guaranteed if similar benefits were already available to
other workers, large coverage gaps existed for women experiencing
pregnancy and maternity. That this was considered equality demonstrates a
35. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 288.050.1(1) (Supp. 1984) (disqualifying any employee
who left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to that work).
36. 479 U.S. 511, 513 (1987).
37. Id. (“A deputy for the Division determined that petitioner had ‘quit because of
pregnancy,’ and therefore had left work ‘voluntarily and without good cause
attributable to [her] work or to [her] employer.”).
38. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (2006) (providing that no State participating in the
federal-state unemployment compensation program shall deny compensation solely on
the basis of pregnancy).
39. Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 511.
40. Id. at 517 (construing the FUTA as prohibiting disadvantageous treatment of
pregnant workers rather than mandating preferential treatment, and therefore, finding
that the Missouri law was not inconsistent with the federal statute).
41. Id. at 511, 517-18.
42. See id. at 521 (pointing to the FUTA’s legislative history as evidence of
Congress’s approval of facially neutral laws like Missouri’s as well as its intent to
merely prohibit states from passing laws that single out pregnant women for
disadvantageous treatment).
43. See id. at 518 (noting that even the petitioner conceded that the FUTA does not
prohibit states from denying benefits to pregnant women who do not satisfy neutral
eligibility requirements, such as ability and availability for work).
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particular and narrow conception of equality that merely requires facial
neutrality and avoids explicit distinctions of women versus men. Such a
concept of equality also ignores both the reality of social conditions—such
as biological procreative differences between women and men, which have
a significant impact on true “equality”—and the socially imposed gender
division of labor that makes certain “neutral” laws more harmful to women
than to men. Although the PDA ensures gender-neutrality, it clearly harms
women in some areas much more than men: most women will become
pregnant and give birth at some point in their lives,44 while no man ever
will. These pregnancy cases set the groundwork for recognition of the
necessity of the FMLA, which was meant to be a solution to these types of
inequalities resulting from existing law. In fact, in 2003, the Supreme
Court declared that the historical context of state-imposed and sanctioned
barriers to women in employment justified the enactment of the FMLA.45
The Court also held that this historical discrimination implicated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause46—an approach that had
long been utilized in cases of race discrimination, but one that courts
previously rejected in early cases of sex discrimination.47 Given this
context and the limitations of the PDA, Congress attempted to even the
playing field through the passage of a comprehensive policy requiring that
employment leave be available for workers who, for medical reasons,
needed to take time off to care for themselves or a family member. This
policy eventually became the FMLA.
III. PASSAGE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
Family benefits are important to workers. Many indices demonstrate
that women value these benefits on average about twice as much as men
do. One poll indicated that 40% of mothers stated that family benefits were
44. See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2006),
available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/fertility/cps2006/table1-06allraces.xls (asserting that approximately 20% of women in their early forties have
never had children); KUNZ CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WORK, FAMILY, & GENDER, WORK
AND
FAMILY
IN
AMERICA:
CURRENT
STATISTICS,
available
at
http://asweb.artsci.uc.edu/sociology/kunzctr/stats.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2008)
(finding that women are increasingly delaying childbirth, such that the number of
women in their forties without a child has risen from 10% in the 1970s to 18% in
1994).
45. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 734-35 (2003) (holding
that the states’ participation in and fostering of gender-based discrimination in leave
benefits justified the enactment of the FMLA).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. See, e.g., Spencer v. Bd. of Registration, 8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 169 at *7 (1873)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide women with the right to
vote; it merely gives them the capacity to become voters).
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more important than any other job benefit, whereas only 21% of fathers
held the same opinion.48 In the same poll, 50% of mothers, compared to
26% of fathers, indicated that family responsive policies were even more
important than pay, and 47% of those who lacked leave time for family
illness indicated that they would sacrifice pay or benefits to gain such
leave.49 Clearly, there is a need that is not being met, and women seem to
feel the pressure of that need more strongly than men.
Workplace initiatives and legal policies that address family needs
generally fall into three categories: (1) leave time to care for family
medical needs; (2) flexible work schedules that do not decrease total work
hours but allow workers to schedule work hours around family needs; and
(3) workplace social support for parents.50 While (2) and (3) are largely
considered voluntary on the part of employers and are encouraged but not
required, the FMLA and other legal initiatives have focused on mandatory
leave time as a critical step in insuring the well-being of workers and their
families. The latter two, however, are important elements of social policy
that cannot be overlooked, and will be briefly addressed later in this paper.
A. History, Debates, and Passage of the FMLA
Like many Congressional successes, the FMLA had a history of failure
within Congress prior to its enactment with various versions of the law
proposed and fiercely debated before the current Act passed in 1993. The
first proposal was the Family Employment Security Act (FESA) in 1984,
which was never formally introduced in Congress but did begin discussion
of the underlying principles of “family care” and “job security” that
remained key components of proposed legislation throughout the decade.51
A year later, the Parental Disability Leave Act was proposed in the house,
but died in committee. Again in 1986, the Parental and Medical Leave Act
was proposed, with more bipartisan support in both houses of Congress, but
also died before a vote in either House.52
Key debates in these bills concerned the length of leave that should be
provided, the amount of time the worker must be employed to qualify for
48. Jennifer L. Glass & Sarah Beth Estes, The Family Responsive Workplace, 23
ANN. REV. SOC. 289, 293 (1997).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 294.
51. See STEVEN K. WISENSALE, FAMILY LEAVE POLICY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF WORK AND FAMILY IN AMERICA 136-37 (2001) (describing the objective of the
FESA as not aimed solely at maternity leave, but a broad array of employee rights,
including pregnancy, a child’s illness, and a spouse’s disability, that would benefit all
workers regardless of gender).
52. See id. at 141-44 (stating that although the FMLA emerged from the Education
and Labor Committee with a favorable, partisan vote, the House Democratic leadership
decided the bill was not ready for a vote and should be reintroduced in 1987).
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leave, the minimum size of the company to be held to the new legal
requirements, and how much these benefits would cost businesses.53
Strong opposition was voiced within the business community, and
President George H.W. Bush promised to veto the law if it passed
Congress.54 There were various debates played out with these bills, and
controversy revolved around issues such as whether to provide “special
treatment” for women as opposed to a gender-neutral law that allowed men
the same leave as women. Another point of contention was to what extent
the policies should be modeled after European ones, many of which had
already been around for some time. Whether leave should be paid was also
debated, but given the conservative political climate under a Republican
president, it was agreed that the proposal for paid leave was too
controversial and was dropped.55 The cost of the law to businesses was one
of the larger issues, with enormous variation in the estimates of the
financial burden businesses would have to endure if the law became
effective. When the U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimated the cost at
between two and sixteen billion dollars, the General Accounting Office
conducted a fiscal impact study that determined the Chamber of Commerce
had inflated its numbers, and came in with a much lower estimate at $188
to 236 million.56
In an interesting dynamic, proponents of the law emphasized its benefit
to men and children as a major selling point, indicating that its importance
to women was not valuable enough to warrant its passage, but instead
required demonstration of how useful the law would be for everyone else.57
In fact, a major selling point amongst Congressional Republicans was the
idea that the FMLA would reduce abortions because, if women didn’t have
to lose their jobs to have babies, they would be less likely to abort a
pregnancy.58 Along similar lines, another important argument centered on
53. See id. at 142-44 (describing Republican opposition to the FMLA and their
demands to reduce company size, time for family leave, time for medical leave, and to
exempt certain high-paid employees from coverage).
54. See id. at 146 (noting that 1988 was a low point for the FMLA, as it had been
stalled in both houses for three years and the incoming president, George H. W. Bush,
campaigned against it and promised to veto the bill if Congress passed it).
55. See id. at 138 (explaining that the choice to drop paid leave was motivated by a
desire to avoid a battle over the cost of a new entitlement program and a desire to
defuse strong opposition early on).
56. See id. at 145.
57. See Roundtable Discussion: The Family and Medical Leave Act: A Dozen
Years of Experience: Examining the Family Medical Leave Act: Hearing Before S.
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong. 8, 9 (2005) [hereinafter
Roundtable Discussion: The Family and Medical Leave Act] (emphasizing the positive
effects the FMLA has had on all workers particularly because the parental leave
permitted under the FMLA has improved early child development).
58. See WISENSALE, supra note 51, at 146 (explaining that Republicans’ lower
abortion rates argument in support of the bill provided the political cover they needed

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol16/iss4/2

12

Anthony: The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: Gender-Neut

2008]

HIDDEN HARMS OF THE FMLA

471

the claim that men were being discriminated against in family leave
policies, given that when they did exist, they were more likely to apply to
women. The Supreme Court even utilized this argument, claiming that,
“[m]en, both in the public and private sectors, receive notoriously
discriminatory treatment in their requests for such leave.”59 It is an
important dynamic that where women suffer from gender inequality,
measures aimed to reduce its effects cannot pass without reference to the
benefits expected by men. At times, equal treatment for women is
interpreted as discrimination against men.
Those opposing the FMLA primarily consisted of businesses and
employers who were concerned with shielding the private sector from
“unnecessary costs and excessive government regulations.”60 Opponents
argued that employers should voluntarily provide leave policies, and
President Bush agreed, proposing a voluntary incentive plan to encourage,
but not require, businesses to do so.61 In addition, opponents argued that
the FMLA would actually increase gender inequality in the workplace by
leading to more gender discrimination since employers would be
disinclined to hire women due to the presumption that women are more
likely to take such leave.62 If this were true, it would represent a larger
problem of gender inequality in society, and should not be a reason to
abandon the cause; rather, it underscores the need to enforce
antidiscrimination policies and change social attitudes about gender. The
arguments against the FMLA presumed some workers must suffer in order
to protect business interests. The majority of those workers would be
women. Businesses resented being required to provide women with
employment opportunities because the “ideal worker” was still based upon
the male standard of someone who has a spouse available to take care of
the domestic and caregiving needs of the family.
The 1987 FMLA garnered much stronger support than any of its
predecessors, and although Republicans introduced controversial
amendments as well as a procedural filibuster intended to kill the law,
several high-ranking Republicans broke ranks and supported the FMLA.63
to avoid jeopardizing their position with a vote in support of family leave).
59. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003).
60. See WISENSALE, supra note 51, at 95 (explaining that many in the business
community viewed the FMLA as a “Trojan Horse that would allow big government to
intervene in corporate personnel matters”).
61. See id. at 149 (justifying President Bush’s thirty-second veto of the FMLA as
an indication that he wanted to emphasize the importance of employer-provided leave
benefits without mandating that employers provide such leave).
62. See id. at 162.
63. Id. at 146 (noting that one House Republican, Representative Henry Hyde, was
persuaded to vote in favor of the FMLA when he was convinced that allowing women
family leave after the birth of a child would reduce the number of abortions in the
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By 1990, proponents of the law had enough votes to pass it through the
House and Senate, but not enough to override Bush’s veto.64 Congress was
not done yet; it passed the bill a second time in 1992, which was vetoed
again by Bush, who claimed to support family leave policies but argued
they should be voluntary for employers rather than mandatory. This time
Bush’s veto was overridden by the Senate, but the House could not garner
the necessary votes for an override, and the bill failed again. Democrats
waited for the next election in hopes of introducing the bill a third time if
Bush lost the race for the presidency.65 In November 1992, Bill Clinton
was elected President—the first Democrat to hold that position in twelve
years—and the Family and Medical Leave Act swept through Congress
easily before Clinton was inaugurated. Clinton signed the FMLA into law
as his first major piece of legislation in February 1993.
Despite the fact that the FMLA is on its face gender-neutral, there were
many gendered dynamics behind its passage. The law was a continuation
of feminist efforts toward equal employment for women, and was lauded
by many feminist groups. A number of these groups strongly lobbied for
its passage, including the Women’s Legal Defense Fund, National
Organization for Women, Women’s Equity League, National Council of
Jewish Women, and the Junior League; a total of 239 groups and
organizations supported the Act.66 With respect to the debate over “special
treatment” versus “equal treatment,” any provision that applied only to
women was considered “special treatment” and therefore unacceptable—
whether women actually had a greater need was irrelevant for purposes of
this debate. The approach used created a standard of “gender equality” in
leave policies that resulted in coverage not just for women, and for more
than just childbirth. While this standard overlooks the social reality that a
greater share of the burden of caregiving is placed on women, there is a
compelling argument for the gender-neutrality of leave policies: granting
parental leave only to women implicitly assumes—and reinforces—that
childcare is women’s work only. In so doing, it exacerbates the inequality
in the division of labor at home. The Supreme Court took up this position
in Hibbs, stating, “[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles are
country).
64. See id. at 146-47.
65. See id. at 149 (observing that Democrats relied on the change in political
makeup of the House and Senate to provide new opportunities to garner support for the
bill).
66. Legislative Hearing on H.R. 1, the Family and Medical Leave Act Before the H.
Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 103d Cong.
55-60 (1993) [hereinafter Legislative Hearing on H.R. 1]; see WISENSALE, supra note
51, at 150 (elaborating that instead of weakening like the child care coalition of the
1970s, the FMLA grew stronger by making the bill more appealing to undecided
parties as well as converting prior adversaries).
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reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic
responsibilities for men.”67 The Court noted that those stereotypes were
firmly rooted at the time of the FMLA’s passage,68 and created a “selffulfilling cycle of discrimination that forced women to continue to assume
the role of primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical
views about women’s commitment to work and their value as
employees.”69 While this is no doubt true, it overlooks the fact that
changing the law merely masks those social stereotypes, assumptions, and
expectations of women’s caregiving roles and does not repair the problem.
A law that refuses to take gender into account is effective only if the
private social structure does not itself perpetuate women’s inequality,
regardless of what the law says. The United States is nowhere near that
point.
Indeed, gender was largely on the mind of Congress when it passed the
FMLA; the stated purpose of the law was to “minimize the potential for
employment discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that
leave is available for eligible medical reasons (including maternity-related
disability) and for compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral basis.”70
Thus, the congressional intent behind the FMLA was clearly to alleviate a
pattern of historic and unconstitutional gender discrimination. The law
sought to “promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for women
and men, pursuant to [the Equal Protection] clause.”71 While they had in
mind employer policies that provided medical leave but not maternity
leave, congressional findings also revealed that “due to the nature of the
roles of men and women in our society, the primary responsibility for
family caretaking often falls on women, and such responsibility affects the
working lives of women more than it affects the working lives of men.”72
Congress’s view of those who suffered most from the lack of leave
policies—and therefore those who stood to benefit most from the FMLA—
were working women. This demonstrates an understanding that when there
is no leave policy, women suffer more from that deficiency as a result of
their socially imposed roles; Congress was striving to remedy the genderdiscriminatory impact of not having employer family leave policies. Yet
an important point is overlooked: if the lack of parental leave for either
gender is seen as a sex discrimination issue for women due to socially
67. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
68. See id. at 730 (referring to employers’ reliance on such stereotypical allocation

of family duties in establishing leave policies).
69. Id. at 736.
70. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)-(5).
71. See id. § 2601(b)(4).
72. Id. § 2601(a)(5).
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imposed roles, then why is Congress convinced that providing genderneutral parental leave on limited terms produces gender equality when
those socially imposed roles are still present? To be sure, any leave policy
is better than none. But the gender-neutral presence of a policy does not
automatically produce equality any more than the gender-neutral lack of a
policy does. There are many limits to the FMLA, and they are likely to
harm women disproportionately.
B. Legal Requirements and Provisions of the FMLA
The FMLA allows a covered employee to take leave to care for her- or
himself, children, spouse, or parents for a serious medical illness, or the
birth or adoption of a baby. The terms that were finally signed into law
provide various requirements for an employee to be covered under the Act.
To be able to take FMLA leave, an employee must have worked for the
employer for at least one year and for a total of at least 1,250 hours within
the last year. The leave-taker must be working for a company that employs
at least fifty people within a seventy-five-mile radius, and the length of
leave is limited to twelve weeks within a year. The leave is unpaid, and
when taken due to illness, is only available for serious illness, which is
defined as requiring more than three consecutive days’ treatment, and must
involve more than one medical treatment via doctor or hospital.73 Thus,
illnesses such as cold, flu, upset stomach, headaches, earaches, and dental
problems are not covered.74 In addition, thirty days’ advance notice is
required, or else the employer can delay the leave for thirty days from the
date the notice is provided.75 If all of these qualifying conditions are met,
the employee has the right to twelve weeks of unpaid leave, and to return to
his or her job in the same position (or its equivalent) from which he or she
left.76
C. Implementation of the FMLA: Harm Based on Gender, Race, and Class
The problems resulting from the FMLA’s limitations are numerous and
provide significant barriers to access for some groups, especially women,
minorities, and the poor. First, the law’s scope of coverage is quite
limiting, especially for women. Only 6% of all work establishments, and
73. ALLAN WEITZMAN, JOSEPH SANTORO & DEANNA GELAK, TIME OFF TO REFLECT

FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 7 (2001) (summarizing regulatory criteria
for coverage of an absence due to a serious health condition).
74. See id. (listing common illnesses left out of FMLA coverage as they do not
meet aforementioned regulatory criteria).
75. See id. at 10-11 (elaborating that if thirty days’ notice is not practicable or leave
is unforeseeable, the employee is required to notify the employer as soon as is
practicable under the circumstances of the case).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) (2006).
ON THE
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60% of all American workers, are covered,77 which leaves 33.6 million
workers unprotected.78 When including the 1250 hour work requirement,
the percentage of covered workers is reduced to 46%.79 Studies indicate
that unprotected workers tend to be less affluent; the financially secure
workers are more likely to work in the larger organizations that are covered
by the law.80 Women are more likely than men to be employed in part-time
positions with lower pay and fewer benefits, which means they are also less
likely to be covered by the leave provisions of the FMLA.81 On top of that,
women are more likely to change jobs and transition in and out of the labor
force due to childbearing and other family needs, so the FMLA’s length of
employment requirement of 12 months limits women more than men. This
often results in a “decrease in mothers’ financial and occupational
attainment.”82
Tightly tied into this analysis is the fact that FMLA leave is unpaid.
Only 34% of all those taking leave received any pay.83 Of those who were
entitled to take leave but did not, the top reason stated was the unpaid
nature of the leave;84 about 60% of those not taking leave stated that they
could not afford to be unpaid for that length of time.85 Naomi Gerstel and
Katherie McGonagle place the number of respondents citing financial
reasons at 64%, while the National Partnership of Women and Families
states that it is 78%.86 The National Partnership for Women and Families
estimates that about 50% of all full time private sector workers, and 25% of
low wage workers, are afforded any type of paid sick leave at all.87 Less
77. See WISENSALE, supra note 51, at 151.
78. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS:

FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS, 2000 UPDATE 7-1 (2001), available at
http://webharvest.gov/peth04/20041118135126/www.dol.gov/asp/fmla/chapter2.htm
[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR].
79. See Wen-Jui Han & Jane Waldfogel, Parental Leave: The Impact of Recent
Legislation on Parents’ Leave Taking, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 191, 191 (2003).
80. Naomi Gerstel & Katherine McGonagle, Job Leaves and the Limits of the
Family and Medical Leave Act: The Effects of Gender, Race, and Family, 26 WORK &
OCCUPATIONS 510, 525 (1999) (interpreting a table of logistic regression regarding
adding coverage to predict leave taking among those needing leave).
81. Glass & Estes, supra note 48, at 300 (concluding that as family responsibilities
expand, mothers are more likely than fathers to change jobs, work part-time, or exit the
labor force due to the financial inability to lose the father’s wages).
82. Id.
83. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 78, at 4-5.
84. Gerstel & McGonagle, supra note 80, at 523-24.
85. See WISENSALE, supra note 51, at 158.
86. Gerstel & McGonagle, supra note 80, at 523-24; see also DONNA LENHOFF,
NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, FAMILY LEAVE BENEFITS: A MENU
OF POLICY MODELS FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICY LEADERS 2 (2001) (pointing out that
the problem is most severe for lower-income families).
87. See Roundtable Discussion: The Family and Medical Leave Act, supra note 57,
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than 33% of workers have any paid sick days that allow them leave to care
for sick children.88 Gerstel and McGonagle found that half of those taking
leave returned to work early because they could not afford any additional
time off.89 They argue that the FMLA targets for protection people with
access to resources, especially white, middle class, and married workers.
Their study found that low-income workers were more likely to be denied
leave when they requested it, and felt more pressure to return to work when
taking leave. Even in establishments covered under the law, leave was
found to be more accessible to those with higher incomes. Yet if one
considers who needs the leave the most, these results are incongruous: lowand middle-income working adults spend much more time caring for
elderly parents than higher earners. Forty percent of these lower-income
workers spend one to four hours per month providing such care, compared
with only 27% of higher-income individuals.90 But the lower-income
workers who provide more care are also less likely to have access to family
leave, or the potential for job flexibility.91 Jennifer Glass and Sarah Beth
Estes cite a study reporting that the same dynamic is witnessed when
considering only women: “women in professional and managerial positions
are much more likely to receive family friendly benefits such as funded
maternity leave, schedule flexibility, and child-care assistance than are
women in less skilled jobs,” and they note that the mothers most in need of
family accommodations, such as low-income single mothers, are the least
likely to receive them.92
Findings of other studies vary, but all indicate that the lack of paid leave
is an enormous obstacle to taking leave when perceived to be necessary.
Those who do not have sick or vacation time available or a partner earning
enough to support the family single-handedly are placed in a very difficult
position, having to choose between time off to care for a newborn and
keeping a job that is necessary for the family’s livelihood. In fact, the
at 12; see also LENHOFF, supra note 86, at 18 (stating that two-thirds of the working
poor lack paid sick leave or paid vacation days).
88. See Roundtable Discussion: The Family and Medical Leave Act, supra note 57,
at 12; see also LENHOFF, supra note 86, at 18 (concluding that working families must
frequently choose between their paychecks and ill children or family members).
89. See Gerstel & McGonagle, supra note 80, at 524 (adding that about 25% of
those whose leave was unpaid, or only partially paid, had to borrow money during their
leave).
90. Caregivers Caught in a Time-Off Crunch, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REPORT,
Jan. 21, 2005, at 5 (explaining that low-income workers spend more time caring for
their elderly parents even though they have less leave and flexibility to meet these
needs).
91. Katherin Ross Phillips, Access to Leave Among Working Parents, No. B-57 in
Series, New Federalism: National Survey of America’s Families, available at
http://www.urban.org/publications/310977.html (last viewed Sept. 29, 2008).
92. Glass & Estes, supra note 48, at 300.
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Department of Labor stated that 100% of eligible women who did need
maternity-disability leave but did not take it made that choice because they
could not afford to take leave.93 With women generally having less income
than men, constituting a larger percentage of the poor, and the fact that
women are employed in positions where they are less likely to be covered
under the FMLA, it becomes clear that the limitations in the law play out
differently based upon gender.94
A very obvious and wide-reaching problem with the implementation of
the FMLA is that, whatever the limitations of the law, the limitations will
impact women more than men due to the fact that women more often take
on caregiving responsibility in our society than men. A portion of that is
biological: women, and only women, will give birth to children. But the
rest of women’s burden is socially imposed, and is significant. On average,
adult women up to age sixty-five spend about twenty-two hours per week
doing housework, even when they are employed outside the home, while
men average ten hours of housework per week.95 Interestingly, the amount
of housework done by men does not change significantly when their wives
work outside of the home or when young children are in the home.96
Others have found that women do 65-80% more caregiving than men, and
that working women carry a disproportionately large load of caregiving,
while having less sick leave time or work flexibility than men.97 Indeed,
most work schedules still operate on the male breadwinner model, which
assumes that employees do not have family demands that must be
addressed. Since women are more likely to be responsible for caregiving
responsibilities at home, yet less likely to be in a position with paid leave,
and less likely to have high incomes to be able to afford it, the end result is
the feminization of poverty. In 2003, the percentage of the poor who lived
in female-headed households was 50%,98 almost three times the rate in
93. See U.S. COMMISSION ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE, A WORKABLE
BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES 272-73
(1996) (explaining that 1% of women who need leave name maternity-disability as a
reason for needing leave, yet none of those women take the needed leave because they
cannot afford it).
94. See Daniel N. Hawkins & Shawn D. Whiteman, Balancing Work and Family:
Problems and Solutions for Low-Income Families, in WORK-FAMILY CHALLENGES FOR
LOW-INCOME PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 273, 275 (Anne C. Coulter & Alan Booth
eds., 2004) (explaining that even though the gender gap in pay is diminishing in lowwage markets, it is occurring as a result of a gradual decrease in men’s blue collar
market jobs, not an increase in women’s wages).
95. See KUNZ CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WORK, FAMILY, & GENDER, WORK AND
FAMILY IN AMERICA: CURRENT STATISTICS, supra note 44.
96. See id. (noting that household tasks also differ by gender, as men mostly
perform yard and home maintenance work, while women are mostly responsible for
grocery shopping, cooking, laundry, and dishwashing).
97. Caregivers Caught in a Time-Off Crunch, supra note 90, at 5.
98. HARRELL R. RODGERS, AMERICAN POVERTY IN A NEW ERA OF REFORM 30 (2d

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2008

19

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 2

478

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:4

1959,99 and over one in four single-mother families were poor.100 It should
be noted that the greater the percentage of an employer’s workforce
consists of women, the larger the chance that family-friendly policies will
be found in those workplaces.101 While having such family-friendly
policies is not a bad thing, it effectively locks women into “feminine”
positions and solidifies male dominance and overrepresentation in
traditionally male positions.
Some studies have shown that the gender gap in pay has been reduced to
the penalties of motherhood. The Waldfogel study suggests that the
penalty for mothers became a larger component of the gender gap in the
eleven years from 1980 to 1991.102 As discussed earlier, this unequal
treatment continues to support a traditional division of domestic labor and
supports women’s homemaking and motherhood roles by precluding other
viable options. The inequality of caregiving responsibilities and the
gendered division of labor in the home exacerbates for women the
limitations of the FMLA and reinforces the continuing inequality they
experience in the labor market as well. Gerstel and McGonagle argue that
“whereas the act may have been passed as an attempt at gender-neutral
policy, the opportunities it ensures are not only highly gendered, but also
restricted by race and family characteristics.”103
Employers’ claims that they resist meaningful family leave policies
because of financial concerns are dubious. Employers incorporate other
expensive benefits aimed at assisting the masculine head of household
worker: while only 40% of workers in a 1989 Bureau of Labor Statistics
study received maternity leave, 53% received leave for military service,
81% received some type of employer provided pension, and 94% received
life insurance.104 Maternity leave is not a benefit necessary to the male
ed. 2006).
99. See KUNZ CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WORK, FAMILY, & GENDER, WORK AND
FAMILY IN AMERICA: CURRENT STATISTICS, supra note 44 (stating that in 1959, 18% of
the poverty population lived in female-headed households).
100. RODGERS, supra note 98, at 30 (noting that in 2003, 28% of all female headed
families were poor).
101. See Glass & Estes, supra note 48, at 302 (adding that firm size, in addition to
female concentration in the workplace, is also an important determinant of the number
of family policies that are offered).
102. Jane Waldfogel, Working Mothers Then and Now: A Cross-Cohort Analysis of
the Effects of Maternity Leave on Women’s Pay, in GENDER AND FAMILY ISSUES IN THE
WORKPLACE 92, 119 (Francine D. Blau & Ronald G. Ehrenberg eds., 1997) (arguing
that even though the gender pay gap narrowed between 1980 and 1991, the returns that
women and men received in the labor market for their family status was different for
both sexes, and concluding that the penalties women received for being married or a
parent increased 17% from 1980 to 1991).
103. Gerstel & McGonagle, supra note 80, at 512.
104. Glass & Estes, supra note 48, at 299 (indicating that the lack of widespread
institutionalization of family leave benefits, as compared to other government benefit
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breadwinner, yet pension, life insurance, and military leave are, so
employers institute the benefits necessary for men, even at substantial cost,
and reject “women’s” benefits based on cost.
If these facts about the gendered nature of leave-taking need and
behavior are true, we should expect to see those results borne out in
statistics regarding FMLA leave. Indeed, a Department of Labor study on
the FMLA in 2000 reveals some telling facts, showing that approximately
49% of FMLA leave was to care for someone other than the employee, and
caring for children accounts for more work leave than any other group
other than caring for oneself.105 An estimated 58% of those taking FMLA
leave are women.106 Gerstel and McGonagle found that 22% of all FMLA
leave was to care for children;107 interestingly, however, they also
determined that while having children in the home significantly increases
the length of leave for women, it actually decreases the length of leave for
men.108 Women’s increased responsibilities at home are confirmed in the
finding that women are much more likely to feel pressure to take leave:
nearly 25% of women felt such pressure compared with 16.3% of men.109
Those with less money reported needing leave more than those with higher
income, as did those with children at home, but those groups did not
actually take leave any more often than other groups, despite their
increased need.110 In fact, those with higher income are slightly more
likely to take leave than others, and that is probably due to the fact that they
are more likely to have access to it, to have paid leave, or to have the
ability to afford taking unpaid leave.111
In fact, when men take FMLA leave, it is significantly more likely to be
for themselves, even if maternity leave is considered leave for oneself.112
While men account for 42% of FMLA leave-takers, 58% of those men use

programs, continues to protect the male-centric workplace).
105. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 78, at 2-5 (describing in more detail that
caring for one’s parent as a more frequent reason for obtaining leave than caring for
one’s spouse).
106. See Roundtable Discussion: The Family and Medical Leave Act, supra note 57,
at 8.
107. See Gerstel & McGonagle, supra note 80, at 522. The U.S. Department of
Labor, however, placed this number at 30%. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 78,
at table 2.3 (stating that 18.5% of leave was to care for a newborn or newly adopted
child or newly placed foster child, and 11.5% of leave was to care for an ill child).
108. See Gerstel & McGonagle, supra note 80, at 522.
109. See id. at 519.
110. See id. at 520.
111. See id. at 521 (showing that those with an income greater than $30,000 are
three percent more likely to take leave).
112. Id. at 522 (adding that less than five percent of women who take leave do so for
maternity disability).
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the leave for their own illness.113 Women are twice as likely as men to take
leave to care for their children or parents, and four times as likely to take
leave to care for another relative’s health.114
Adding to the drawbacks of the FMLA, the definition of “family” for
whom one may take leave is also limited: only a child, spouse, parent, or
parent-in-law qualifies as one for whom leave may be taken.115 This
represents a narrow conception of caregiving and in effect defines what
types of caregiving relationships are legitimate. This limitation serves to
reinforce the white, heterosexual, nuclear family norm of relationships in
that it only allows for the inclusion of heterosexual relationships and
excludes extended family members, the latter of which is likely to have a
harsher impact on minorities and cultures exhibiting a greater emphasis on
extended family ties.
Furthermore, the fact that the law only allows leave for serious illness,
defined as more than three days and more than one medical treatment,
means that a parent who needs to stay home to care for a child with the flu,
a cold, or ear infection will not have access to leave, unless it is voluntarily
provided by the employer. Even leave for medical check-ups and child
immunizations would not exist. Since women are more likely to be the
parent who stays home, the lack of this type of leave hurts them
disproportionately. Lower-income families are also harmed by the
requirement that more than one medical treatment must be sought—not
only is pay lost from missing work, but extra money must be spent on
doctor visits that may not be necessary except to meet the requirements of
“serious illness” under the law.
A final problem with the FMLA is not inherent in the law itself or
determined by its provisions; rather, it is caused by societal norms that
paint the ideal worker in masculine, individual, and autonomous terms.
Occupational standards often fail to take account of familial ties and
caregiving responsibilities, which are necessary and critical in any society.
Even when a given company has family-friendly work policies in
compliance with the FMLA, or goes above and beyond the Act’s
requirements, a stigma persists in taking or asking for such leave, as some
organizational cultures frown upon taking leave. Pressure from bosses and
coworkers has a significant impact on whether leave is taken. This again
was found to have a disproportionate impact on women, with 26% of
113. Roundtable Discussion: The Family and Medical Leave Act, supra note 57, at

8.
114. See Gerstel & McGonagle, supra note 80, at 522 (noting that people with more
income are more likely to take leave to care for others, in part resulting from the fact
that the less affluent can only afford to miss work when they are too sick to work,
whereas the affluent can care for others as well as themselves).
115. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
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women stating they “felt pressure to return to work by bosses and
coworkers,” compared to 19% of men, and individuals with less income
felt similar increased pressure, as compared to individuals with more
income.116 Some studies find that leave is often discouraged by managers
and/or organizational culture, especially for lower level employees.117
Glass and Estes argue that “[q]ualitative evidence has repeatedly revealed
that employees will not take advantage of family responsive policies . . . if
they feel that doing so will jeopardize their job security, work assignments,
or promotional possibilities,” and point out that managers often have room
to subvert formal policy when employees have to receive supervisor
permission before taking leave, as is often the case.118
In considering the best way to approach gender issues in work policies,
there is a difference between including both women and men in the policy,
and being gender-neutral. An inclusive policy would represent the needs
of both genders, and take realistic account of their divergent situations in
society. One need not hold that the “differences” between women and men
are innate or biological to take this approach; whatever their original
source, our social norms make those differences real, and legal policy must
take account of them to be truly effective. The FMLA is a gender-neutral
policy, but it fails to consider the individual needs of women created by a
social construct that places heavy burdens on them in the “private” sphere
of family life. As such, it tends to reinforce the disparity of those burdens
while claiming to equalize them.
D. Expanding the FMLA
Several expansions of the law have been proposed based on a partial
recognition of some of the problems with the FMLA noted herein. In 1996,
President Clinton proposed the Family-Friendly Workplace Act, which
purported to fill in some important gaps of the FMLA. It allowed overtime
workers to choose between receiving extra money and taking compensatory
time.119 This is important since many workers would prefer to receive
more time to spend with family than extra money, as discussed above. The
116. See Gerstel & McGonagle, supra note 80, at 527 (citing studies which showed
that 28% of lower-income workers felt pressured to return to work whereas only 21%
of higher-income workers felt the same pressure).
117. See id. (asserting that even where company culture is sympathetic to family
matters, managers may discourage employees from taking advantage of policies that
are in place).
118. Glass & Estes, supra note 48, at 301 (finding that employees did not take
advantage of leave, work reduction, and work schedule policies where they had to
receive permission from their superiors to change their work schedule or take time off).
119. See J. Marshall Wolman, Equity Between the Public and Private Sectors: The
Need for Compensatory Time Legislation for the Private Sector, 12 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 243, 251-52 (2005).
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Family-Friendly Workplace Act also allowed twenty-four hours of unpaid
leave each year to fulfill certain family obligations, including routine
medical visits and school activities relating to academic achievement, such
as parent/teacher conferences, or routine medical appointments for children
or elderly relatives. It has been found that low-income children are
particularly academically vulnerable because their parents are less likely to
be able to take time off from work to be involved in educational activities.
One study found that of children whose reading and math scores were in
the bottom 25%, their parents were more likely to lack paid vacation leave,
sick leave, and work flexibility. Of these children, more than half had
parents without any paid leave at all, and nearly three-quarters of the
parents could not consistently rely on flexibility at work to take time to
meet with teachers and learning specialists.120 Clearly Clinton’s proposal
was an important step, as both children and parents suffer from a lack of
employment leave for short-term minor medical problems as well as
educational involvement, both areas where the FMLA provides no
protection. Yet the proposal did not pass.
Indeed, in the six years following the passage of the FMLA in 1993,
there were almost twenty proposed expansions of the policy, yet not a
single one has been made into law.121 In 1996 a Congressional
Commission on Leave also proposed a “uniform system of wage
replacement for periods of family and medical leave.”122 Two years later
the National Partnership for Women and Families called for an expanded
leave policy that would include wage replacement and extend the
provisions of the FMLA to smaller companies currently not covered.123 In
2002, Senator Christopher Dodd introduced a formal bill that would extend
FMLA coverage to companies with twenty-five or more employees
(instead of the FMLA’s fifty), provide federal grants to states to provide
120. Caregivers Caught in a Time-Off Crunch, supra note 90, at 5.
121. See WISENSALE, supra note 51, at 185 (describing that Congress failed to pass

any initiatives to expand the FMLA, including applying it to smaller companies,
providing additional hours for other family needs, expanding coverage to domestic
partners, or preventing employers from requiring that disputes go to arbitration). Some
of these failed acts included provisions that would allow for leave to attend school
related activities for an employee’s child.
See Family and Medical Leave
Improvements Act of 1997, H.R. 109, 105th Cong. (1997); Time for Schools Act of
1997, S. 280, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Battered Women’s Protection Act, S. 367,
105th Cong. (1997) (addressing adverse job consequences for women suffering from
domestic violence and providing unemployment compensation for such women); H.R.
191, 105th Cong. (1997) (expanding FMLA coverage to a greater percentage of the
U.S. workforce and allowing parental involvement leave for children’s educational
activities).
122. Gerstel & McGonagle, supra note 80, at 530.
123. Id. (noting that wage-replacement is used in some states, and evidence exists to
show that in such states women are more likely to take maternity leave than in states
without the replacement).
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paid leave, allow leave to address a domestic violence situation, and
provide twenty-four hours of school involvement leave per year.124 The
measure did not pass.125
Today, only five out of 173 studied countries do not provide paid
maternity leave for employees: Lesotho, Liberia, Swaziland, Papua New
Guinea, and the United States; the United States is the only wealthy
country worldwide without such a benefit.126 Even as early as 1989, most
European and Western countries provided paid leave, including Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and
the United Kingdom. The number of weeks paid range from eight
(Switzerland) to twenty six (France), and the percentage of the woman’s
regular pay that she receives on leave ranges from 50% (Greece) to 100%
(Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Portugal).127
Qualifying
conditions in other countries vary, but leave periods are almost universally
longer than the leave provided for under the FMLA.128 While some
countries provide paid maternity leave through state social security
systems, others require employers, rather than states, to pay leave for
workers.129 The United States does neither, but could certainly learn some
valuable lessons about which policies work by looking to the practices of
other countries.
Within the United States, standard paid medical leave is not unheard of.
Rhode Island, Hawaii, New Jersey, California, New York, and Puerto Rico
each provide some sort of paid medical leave for workers within their
jurisdiction, and certainly national efforts could mirror some of the
successes of those policies.130 The U.S. Department of Labor took steps to
increase these numbers by adopting an unemployment compensation rule in
August 2000 that allowed state unemployment agencies to provide
124. Family and Medical Leave Expansion Act, S. 3141, 107th Cong. (2002).
125. See id. (the bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education,

Labor and Pensions, but never made it out of committee).
126. See JODY HEYMANN ET. AL., THE WORK, FAMILY, AND EQUITY INDEX: HOW
DOES THE UNITED STATES MEASURE UP? 1-2 (2007).
127. See Press Release, Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], More than 120 Nations Provide
Paid Maternity Leave (Feb. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Press Release, ILO].
128. See Jane Waldfogel, International Policies Toward Parental Leave and Child
Care, 11 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 99, 102 (2001).
129. See ILO, Maternity Protection at Work, WORLD OF WORK, Apr. 1998,
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/magazine/24/matern.htm#
note2 (noting that while over one hundred ILO member countries provide paid leave
through the state, others mandate that employers must provide partial or full benefits to
the worker while on maternity leave).
130. See Press Release, ILO, supra note 127 (revealing that despite a lack of any
national program, a number of U.S. states have implemented successful paid maternity
leave programs similar to many ILO member nations).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2008

25

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 2

484

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:4

unemployment benefits for parents on approved leave for newborns or
newly adopted children.131 There included no job protection provision,
leave itself was not guaranteed but merely paid for by states when
provided, and the program was voluntarily administered by the states. The
amount of leave paid for under the program was also variable by state.132
Although thirteen states considered the program, not a single state
implemented it, and in October 2003 the policy was discontinued and the
rule repealed.133 In addition to the lack of utilization of the program, the
Department of Labor cited as the reason for its repeal that “it encourages
parents to refuse available work.”134
Although various proposals have been discussed, the United States has
seen no expansions or amendments to the FMLA that would serve to
alleviate some of its most harmful elements. Many of those proposals have
aimed to find a way to provide paid leave when workers are forced to take
time off for medical reasons. Such a move would serve to alleviate some
of the most detrimental elements of the current law. Yet our country’s
strong liberal foundations and ties to individualism, autonomy, and limited
government, along with continued notions of the separation of the public
and the private spheres, politically prevent such a measure from taking
hold. Indeed, public attitudes have become increasingly hostile towards
entitlement and social welfare programs in recent decades, and great efforts
have been expended to reduce or eliminate the scope of those programs
already in place.135 Given this growing conservative climate, it may be
exceedingly difficult to institute such programs, despite the fact that most
of the Western world, and even much of the non-Western world, has been
doing so successfully for some time.
We would do well to take a serious look at the harm that is caused by a
failure to act on this need. A great many negative consequences result
from a devaluing of family and caregiving work that is still primarily done
by women. Significant gender, race, and class inequality persist in the
current system. In addition to these harms discussed, however, other
131. Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation, 65 Fed. Reg. 114 (June 13,
2000) (repealed 2003) (expressing that no exact time was set because Congress
preferred not to disrupt existing state regulations).
132. Id.
133. DOL Repeals Birth and Adoption Regs, BUS. & LEGAL REP., Oct. 13, 2003,
available at http://comp.blr.com/display/cfm/id/151170 (stating that the birth and
adoption regulations discouraged parents from accepting available work and therefore
was counter to the Unemployment Compensation program’s aims).
134. Id.
135. JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 166 (2007) (describing measures taken in the 1960s and 70s
to limit welfare; “man in the house” rules, which were relatively common in the early
1960s, required termination of welfare benefits to female beneficiaries engaged in a
casual affair).
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consequences can be expected. Numerous studies have proven that conflict
between family and work responsibilities often lead to lower productivity,
higher absenteeism, and greater turnover, which in turn lead to lowered
career achievement for the worker affected.136 Personal issues result from
the work/family tension as well. Glass and Estes note that research has
consistently shown the links between work/family conflict and physical and
mental health ailments, parenting behaviors, depression, physical distress,
sleep disorders, decreased concentration, decreased alertness, and marital
satisfaction, tension, and companionship.137 They reference research
revealing that “women’s disproportionate responsibility in the home results
in significantly more turnover because of family illness, household duties,
and changes in residence,”138 and noting that the result is that “[w]hen
family responsibilities expand, mothers are more likely than fathers to
change jobs, to work part time, or exit the labor force for a spell . . . . The
result is often a decrease in mothers’ financial and occupational
attainment.”139 Jennifer Glass and Lisa Riley found that certain familyfriendly employer policies significantly decreased job attrition, even after
controlling for the effects of wages, partner income, and number of existing
children.140 The most significant of these policies to benefit workers was
the length of leave available for childbirth, and the ability to avoid
mandatory overtime upon return.141
Paid leave for childbearing and childrearing allows parents more time to
address children’s needs. Such parental attention improves children’s
health, emotional development, and educational success. Such leave also
bolsters a family’s economic outlook, as their long-term employment,

136. See, e.g., Glass & Estes, supra note 48, at 294-97 (detailing that conflicts
between work and family can result in wasted time, mistakes, high job turnover, and
generally less productive employees).
137. Id. at 294-96 (listing the negative effects on an employee’s family that can
result from extended work hours, inflexibility in those hours, and a workplace
environment that is unsupportive of parental needs).
138. Id. at 297 (citing S. Spilerman & H. Schrank, Responses to the Intrusion of
Family Responsibilities in the Workplace, in 10 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL STRATIFICATION
AND MOBILITY 27 (R. Althauser & M. Wallace eds., 1991)).
139. Id. (citing D.H. Felmlee, Causes and Consequences of Women’s Employment
Discontinuity, 1967-1973, 22 WORK OCCUP. 167 (1995), and M. Corcoran et al., Work
Experience, Job Segregation, and Wages, in SEX SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE
171 (B. Reskin ed., 1984)).
140. Jennifer L. Glass & Lisa Riley, Family Responsive Policies and Employee
Retention Following Childbirth, 47 SOC. FORCES 1401, 1417-29 (1998) (analyzing the
effects that hours reduction, schedule flexibility, and social support have on women
returning to the labor force postpartum).
141. See id. at 1401 (asserting that regardless of the worker’s wages, her partner’s
income, or her total number of children, the length of leave available following
childbirth and the ability to avoid having to work overtime on return from that leave
had the greatest impact on the worker’s decision to return to work after she gave birth).
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earning prospects, and job security are improved.142 In addition to more
tangible employment benefits from having family-friendly work policies,
research has demonstrated that reduced work hours increases mental health;
longer time off work after giving birth decreases depression and anger and
leads to lower levels of anxiety, while reducing job turnover; schedule
flexibility is linked to less depression, physical complaints, and lower
blood cholesterol; and social support systems at work reduce the
work/family conflict.143
Thus, if women are harmed more by the FMLA’s failings, the harms are
not just short-term; women can expect lower lifetime career achievements
as a result of their extra burdens at home. This then affects their pay,
seniority, pensions, insurance benefits, and social standing, resulting in a
cyclical process whereby women’s work inequalities push them further
away from decent work and more into the home and part-time work, which
then further limits their employment prospects and opportunities.
Family-friendly policies are not merely good for employees, however.
Other research has shown that policies addressing employees’ needs for
leave lead to increased organizational productivity and decreased turnover,
along with less tardiness and absenteeism, and more job satisfaction.144
Given the benefits of such programs, the costs of instituting them may not
be as significant as it might first appear. There is an enormous range in the
estimates of the cost of a program of paid medical leave, ranging from $6.2
billion to $28.4 billion, but the issue is really more a matter of prioritizing
certain expenses over others.145 The United States provides billions in tax
credits for parents, and billions more in tax incentives and breaks for
businesses. Annual defense spending in 2008 alone is expected to total
over $481 billion,146 and the war in Iraq has cost to date over $300 billion,
with the Congressional Budget Office estimating that the total cost of the
war may reach one trillion dollars by 2010.147 Providing expanded, paid
142. See HEYMAN supra note 126, at 6.
143. See generally Glass & Estes, supra note 48, at 305-06 (reporting how work

policies that were responsive to family needs resulted in benefits to employees’ mental,
emotional, and physical health).
144. See id. at 304 (linking reduced work hours to increased productivity; decreased
turnover and flexible work schedules to decreases in tardiness and absenteeism; and
workplace support of family needs to recruitment and retention of employees).
145. See WISENSALE, supra note 51, at 207 (stating that the Employment Policy
Foundation estimated the cost of expanding the FMLA to include paid leave based on
take-up rates, length of paid leave time, and “other factors”).
146. See OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER), NATIONAL
DEFENSE BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR FY 2008, at 13 (2007), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/; see also National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 1585, 110th Cong. (2007).
147. See Michael Moran, Cost of Iraq War, Like Fog, Is Illusive, STAR-LEDGER OF
NEWARK, Jan. 7, 2007, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/12377/cost_of_
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medical leave is a small percentage of some of these expenditures; the issue
is more one of prioritizing the value of families and the harmony of work
and family obligations.
IV. FEMINIST ANALYSIS
It was not until 1971 that the United States Supreme Court held that
women are entitled to the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection.148 Yet despite that guarantee, our public sphere of work life still
presumes an ideal worker who is a male head-of-household with a spouse
at home to take care of family considerations. The FMLA provides a
certain minimum level of employee protections, but it does not come close
to meeting the real needs of workers, especially the more vulnerable ones.
A good deal of feminist theorizing since the women’s movement gained
steam in the 1960s has focused on the difference versus sameness question:
are women really just the same as men (and therefore to be treated the
same), or are there inherent differences in women that need to be
acknowledged and addressed? In its simplest terms, the debate emulates
the age-old nature versus nurture issue, and it has created some conflicts in
feminism regarding family leave issues and what are the best policies to
equalize women in the workforce.149 Should we support women who
choose to be homemakers and strive to increase the value society places on
such work, or should we encourage women to pursue careers and aim to
provide opportunities for them to do so, including affordable quality child
care and antidiscrimination laws? The question is far from settled, but this
paper has shown that, for purposes of family leave policy, the difference
versus sameness question is largely irrelevant. Women are in the
workforce in greater numbers than ever before,150 and they still bear the
majority of the responsibility in the home.151 Gender difference cannot be
iraq_war_like_fog_is_illusive.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2008) (basing a trillion dollar
Iraq war cost on the assumption that a sizeable U.S. force will remain in Iraq until
2010).
148. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (invalidating an Idaho law granting
automatic preference in the administration of an estate to surviving male relatives on
the grounds that the law denied women equal protection).
149. LISE VOGEL, MOTHERS ON THE JOB: MATERNITY POLICY IN THE U.S.
WORKFORCE 1 (1993) (articulating that a central dilemma that policymakers face when
confronting women’s rights is whether women are better served by trying to achieve
equality with men or by embracing the inherent differences and concerns that women
encounter).
150. See Howard V. Hayghe, Developments in Women’s Labor Force Participation,
120 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 41, 42 (1997) (noting that the labor force participation rate of
women increased from 45.9% in 1975 to nearly 60% in 1996).
151. See Theodore N. Greenstein, Economic Dependence, Gender, and the Division
of Labor in the Home: A Replication and Extension, 62 J. OF MARRIAGE & THE FAM.
322, 322 (2000) (discussing that despite major shifts in women’s labor force
participation and economic roles, married women still do the majority of housework,
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rejected without considering the historical context—if there is no inherent
gender difference, society creates the distinction anyway, and we therefore
cannot pretend that such differences are irrelevant or do not exist, and
simply treat women as men. In the words of Catharine MacKinnon,
“[m]ost disadvantages can be construed as, and therefore become,
differences,”152 mirroring Mill’s claim that women are stripped of
opportunity, then defined as inferior and different when they fail to
achieve.153
The fact is that the law’s dealings with pregnancy, childbearing, and
caregiving are not created from the perspective of those actually doing that
work, but rather from an outside, male viewpoint. This has been evident in
the resulting policies. Creating gender-neutral laws does not erase socially
imposed roles; such laws actually tend to reinforce norms as they obscure
the social forces that naturalize gender difference and pressure women in
the home. If the “neutral” quality of the laws convinces us that we have
equality, then we will either blind ourselves to the inequality that continues
to exist, or attribute that inequality to “inherent” differences in men and
women for which the law can provide no remedy.
A. Implications of the Liberal Approach to Gender Equality
Critical to the issue of gender equality, and also fiercely debated within
feminism, is the question whether liberalism as a political approach even
allows for the possibility of gender equality, and whether it can adjust to
and embrace feminist ends. The United States was founded upon the
liberal principles espoused by Enlightenment philosophers such as Thomas
Hobbes and John Locke, and those principles are still largely fundamental
to and ingrained in our political and legal framework. Liberalism is
classically defined as affirming the basic principles of human reason, selfgovernment, and individual rights, leading to an avowal of achievement
and individualism, and importantly, an entrenchment of a divide between
the realms of public/political/social life and private/domestic/family life.154
The feminist critique of classical liberalism concerns the fact that its
primary tenets typically entail that women occupy the private dimension,

even when husbands earn less or are unemployed).
152. MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 1322 (describing Congress’s amendment to Title
VII to explicitly state that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is discrimination
based on sex, after the Supreme Court ruled that pregnancy discrimination was not
covered under sex).
153. See MILL, supra note 1, at 186 (contending that men attempt to subordinate
women in order to maintain a monopoly on professional life and because men are not
ready to handle living with an equal partner).
154. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST
FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 7 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
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separate and apart from public and political life, thus disguising and
naturalizing their inequality and exempting the family from the
requirements and rights inherent in public liberal life.155 Some, such as
Wendy Brown, have argued that liberalism is inherently flawed in this way,
and that its very terms require inequality, hierarchy, and oppression for the
maintenance of the theory and the advantage of the white men who operate
within it.156 Alternatively, some scholars, such as Susan Moller Okin,
believe that liberalism as a sociological theory is merely incomplete, rather
than inherently flawed.157 Liberalism’s confluence with other factors, such
as gender dependency and racial hierarchy, causes the problems that we
witness in our society and the social orderings that supplement liberalism,
rather than liberalism itself, to be defective.158 While it is possible that
certain aspects of liberal theory make those inequalities more likely and yet
less visible, they are not inherently present.
A critique of liberalism serves to highlight the ways in which the
separate spheres argument is relevant to the FMLA debate. Wendy Brown
argues that liberalism itself systemically produces inequality and hierarchy;
inequality lies at the very foundations of liberalism, and liberalism as a
system cannot function without that inequality—the two concepts are
inextricably enmeshed.159 Claiming, therefore, that liberalism is itself
intrinsically flawed, Brown notes that liberal notions of autonomy,
individuality, and the public/private divide inherently presume a masculine
subject.160 One cannot achieve the ideals of liberalism, Brown claims,
without having the support, and thus creating the oppression, of an
ancillary individual in the private, unregulated, and unrecognized sphere.161
Liberalism therefore depends upon an autonomous male individual’s
oppression of women at home. As such, liberal “rights” aimed at things
like equality and antidiscrimination mask this reality and present a false
perception of equality. Furthermore, Brown claims that the common

155. See WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE
MODERNITY 156-57 (1995).
156. See id. at 152-64 (discussing how key terms of liberal political discourse reveal
male dominance).
157. See OKIN, supra note 6, at 89 (criticizing John Rawls’s theory of justice and
fairness for neglecting to independently address the issue of gender).
158. See id. at 7-14 (asserting that many liberal theorists continue to assume a
gender-structured family with a male serving as the head of a traditional household).
159. See BROWN, supra note 155, at 156-57 (claiming that liberalism allows men to
feel independent in contrast to the perception of women as dependent and reliant on the
family for self-worth).
160. See id. (contending that the autonomous liberal is free, mobile, and selfinterested—qualities that are at odds with historical views of women).
161. See id. at 161-62 (arguing that the selfish liberal requires the invisible labor of a
selfless household subject, who is typically a gendered female).
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political focus on identity politics as a method of achieving rights within a
diverse society only serves to legitimize the social power structure which
makes those differences relevant in the first place.162
The facially gender-neutral character of the FMLA serves to mask the
fact that this social imposition on women still exists, while its terms—such
as lack of pay—ensure that the work is devalued and that women will thus
continue to perform such work. Liberalism’s principles entail that men
acquire citizenship and individuality—characteristics at the core of liberal
theory—through the subordination of women, which is relevant in
consideration of the defects of the FMLA.163 In essence, men could not
attain their public individuality were it not for the work of women in the
private sphere. By definition under liberalism, women will never reach the
same individuality and autonomy as men, and the harms demonstrated by
the FMLA illustrate this point. Because such a result is innate and
irreversible within liberal theory, no matter how the theory is adjusted or
fine-tuned, any approach that utilizes liberalism in an effort to gain gender
equality is necessarily doomed to failure. This means that as long as we are
operating within a liberal system that emphasizes public individuality and
autonomy to the detriment of private connections, amending the FMLA
will be useless. Minor improvements may be seen, but the core of
liberalism and its oppression of women will remain the same. Gender
equality cannot be attained through a liberal scheme.
Employment policies are generally geared more towards the needs of
men than of women, even when they are worded in a gender-neutral way,
and the FMLA does not escape this deficiency. In the public/private
dichotomy, the structure of the public sphere, including public identity and
worth, is naturally oriented towards men rather than women.164 Women,
necessarily defined by others in the public realm, may never have
autonomy or attain their own individual, self-governing, and self-defining
status. Men, on the other hand, depend on women for services within the
private sphere, but that dependence sustains their autonomy as it is
manifested publicly in politics, employment, and society. Women’s
homemaking role allows men to fulfill their employment responsibilities
without many impositions or competing priorities, and to measure up to
and reinforce the masculine nature of work structures. Laws such as the
162. See id. at 98 (describing how claims of property and privacy rights
paradoxically can extend social stratification by empowering one group while
disempowering another).
163. See id. at 160-61 (stating that liberal individualism requires a woman to
surrender selfhood at home for the sake of the selfish male).
164. See id. at 144 (articulating a sexual division of labor in which men’s work is
increasingly socialized and removed from the home while women perform invisible
service functions).
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FMLA do little to change this dynamic.
As gender hierarchies are embedded in liberalism and serve to sustain it,
any notion of reforming the public sphere into a gender-neutral, egalitarian
institution is misguided: we cannot eliminate the hierarchy without
eliminating liberalism, for gender subordination exists in the very terms of
liberal discourse. Furthermore, any attempt to disavow the idea of
gendered subjects within liberal terms only serves to obscure the issue,
while covertly continuing to produce gendered subjects. As such, Brown
would claim that many gender-neutral liberal approaches are more than
simply wrong, but that they actually produce further harm for the status of
women.165 The FMLA reinforces notions of the masculine ideal worker
while wearing the pretense of justice and equality. In that context, any
inequality that remains is deemed to be the fault of women themselves.
Gender-neutral measures may be passed, but they do not eliminate the
gender hierarchy, as the above discussion of the FMLA’s disproportionate
harm to women demonstrates.
Feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon is critical of liberalism and
proposed equality laws whereby women are supposed to achieve equal
rights.166 She argues that the foundations of the current legal system are
still based upon assumptions that were created when women had no rights
at all.167 The existing framework and legal doctrine were never questioned,
but were merely extended to women. This means that the masculine
subject embedded within liberalism is still present, and the extension of the
theory to women will naturally be incongruous as a result. “The point was
to apply existing law to women as if women were citizens—as if the
doctrine was not gendered to women’s disadvantage, as if the legal system
had no sex, as if women were gender-neutral persons temporarily trapped
by law in female bodies.”168 As a result, women have been brought into a
system designed by and for men, but with no more distinctions based on
sex. This assimilationist approach has been harangued by many scholars,
but nevertheless reigns in the liberal “inclusion” of women into its terms

165. See id. at 164-65 (noting that child care and household help allow some women
to advance but only through the subordination of other women providing those
services).
166. MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 1284 (arguing that the U.S. has not done enough
to protect against discrimination based on sex, after failing to ratify the Equal Rights
Amendment in 1971).
167. See id. at 1285-86 (summarizing that legal traditions and practices were created
when the education of women was prohibited, and that legal foundations grew out of a
society in which women were silent property).
168. Id. at 1286 (describing an early approach to advancing women’s rights, which
attempted to provide women equality by refraining from granting women any special
concessions).
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and values.169 The FMLA is a prime example of existing law merely being
extended to women as if they were already citizens in the same right as
men. The social, political, and legal system, including employment
systems, were designed by and for men. Now women are included within
those systems, but the systems’ foundational designs have not changed, and
women continue to suffer as a result.
MacKinnon argues, in a point important to the FMLA discussion above,
that reproductive and caregiving issues have developed legally as issues of
privacy, which necessarily leads to a lack of accountability.170 Everyone is
presumed equal in the private realm, which is of course a legal fiction; but
to the extent it is not true, there is no recourse in the law to rectify it. The
very ideology of privacy as an area unintended for state intervention,
MacKinnon argues, means that the conditions necessary to make autonomy
and individuality real under liberalism cannot be ensured.171 This is why it
is so difficult to enact FMLA-type protections—caregiving issues are seen
as the “private,” “female” arena, unrelated to justice and autonomy, and
therefore of little concern to the law. Any inequalities borne out of the
FMLA that result from the gendered division of labor at home are not
considered the problem of liberalism, the law, or social policy. Yet, as the
feminist mantra claims, “the personal is political,” especially now that a
great deal of the caregivers in society are also working in the public sphere,
creating a wide overlap between the public and private. If the distinction
between the two ever made sense, it certainly does not seem to any longer.
MacKinnon believes that many of women’s social disadvantages can be
traced to their childbearing capacity. “Although reproduction has a major
impact on both sexes, men are not generally fired from their jobs [or]
excluded from public life . . . for making babies,”172 nor are they required
to devote their lives to caregiving in a position that “is not even considered
an occupation but an expression of the X chromosome.”173 Socially
speaking, pregnancy is critical to women’s subordination to men. This
directly relates to the FMLA and its disproportionate harm to women, in
that women are more likely to need medical leave due to their childbearing
capacity, yet are less likely to be in a position where they are able to
169. See id. at 1287-88 (noting that this male-focused idea of equality failed to
address female-focused equality issues such as pregnancy).
170. See id. at 1311 (arguing that the sphere of privacy is controlled by the
individuals in power, leading to isolation and unaccountability rather than equality).
171. See id. (stating that “the doctrine of privacy has become the triumph of the
state’s abdication of women in the name of freedom and self-determination”).
172. Id. at 1308-09 (expressing the viewpoint that biological differences between
men and women have a disadvantageous societal impact on women).
173. Id. at 1312-13 (asserting that childbearing denies women professional and
societal advancement while men are not negatively impacted by their reproductive
facilities).
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qualify for or afford it.
MacKinnon places a great deal of emphasis on what will here be called
the “similarly situated problem,” which is the legal doctrine of equal
treatment stating that those who are similar must be treated equal, while
those who are different may be treated differently.174 In other words,
treating one group differently from another is not allowed as long as the
groups are similar in all important respects. But problems sometimes arise
when women are compared with men. If policies are created that
disadvantage pregnant women, there are no similarly situated pregnant men
that we can point to in order to show that the women are being treated
unfairly; therefore, there is no “inequality.” This was the very problem that
arose in the Supreme Court’s 1976 Gilbert decision, which held that
pregnancy discrimination was not sex discrimination, simply because there
are no pregnant men who are treated better than the pregnant women.175
MacKinnon argues that this “similarly situated” problem is relevant in a
wide range of sex inequality issues, because a legal remedy is available
only when gender comparisons can be shown, but that is impossible when
dealing with issues of procreation.176 She is also critical of the fact that the
point of reference for determining sameness is men: “Why should anyone
have to be like white men to get what they have, given that white men do
not have to be like anyone except each other to have it?”177 In fact, the
worse the gender disparity, the harder it is to show discrimination because
the groups will not be considered similarly situated. In this way, women
are defined as different from men, but then entitled to equality only to the
extent that they are like men. As a result, the similarly situated requirement
functions as a white male standard in disguise. As applied to the FMLA,
this means that women will suffer more from their procreative ability than
will men—for instance, by needing more leave than men for childbirth and
caregiving, or for having less money to be able to afford unpaid leave—but
the law will not recognize a disparity that it must address. If women’s
issues are unique, then there is no discrimination, and therefore no legal
remedy.
The law of inequality is also grossly insufficient, according to

174. See id. at 1286-87 (citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)) (“[a]ll persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike”).
175. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976).
176. MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 1297 (arguing that there is no possible
constitutional equal protection attack against laws regarding procreation, abortion, and
sexual assault because gender comparisons are unavailable or tenuous).
177. See id. at 1287 (stressing the illogical quality of the “similarly situated”
requirement with regard to sex discrimination against women, and arguing that women
should not have to strive to be like the white men they are compared against).
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MacKinnon, in that it relies on the presence of facial classifications.178 The
singling out of a particular group is for the most part the only recognized
manifestation of legal inequality. Yet for issues like the FMLA, facial
classifications are now quite rare and are no longer relevant to women’s
concerns, but sex inequality remains rampant. The FMLA is considered
under liberalism to be promoting sex equality because it is gender-neutral.
But the “conditions of inequality” that made the reform necessary in the
first place have not been changed at all.179 In other words, the FMLA’s
gender-neutral character doesn’t mean it promotes sex equality, because the
reason why we needed the law in the first place—a male-worker standard
in public life that ignores any family obligations and relegates those to
women—is still present. To the extent that women do have problems
specific to women, the law is impotent to address them because it must
remain gender-neutral. As such, women with children will suffer in a
society that “does not allocate resources to assist combining family needs
with work outside the home.”180
With women bearing responsibility for a majority of caregiving—which
leads to increased turnover, lower productivity, and more shifts in and out
of the workforce—the FMLA’s ignorance of the gender disparity may
actually serve to reinforce that disparity and the inequality that results.
MacKinnon’s observation that social norms limit women’s options because
of their “enforced role in childbearing and childrearing” applies directly to
the FMLA.181 Even after childbirth, she argues, women are primarily
responsible for the care of children by social custom, as well as pressure
and exclusion from well paying jobs, the structure of the market, and the
lack of adequate childcare.182
Yet while MacKinnon is harshly critical of the liberal institution that
creates these inequalities, she paradoxically turns to the legal system to
remedy them. She proposes that existing laws be interpreted according to
constitutional sex equality requirements, but without the “similarly

178. See id. at 1299-1300 (arguing that a reliance on facial classifications fails to
address inequality in regards to sexual assault and reproduction because many of these
laws regard inequalities as crimes or privacy violations rather than discrimination on
the basis of sex).
179. Id. at 1292 (arguing that remedying discrimination by requiring gender-neutral
laws is not effective because this strategy does not address the reasons for inequality).
180. Id. at 1312 (expressing that because society often views childbirth and
childrearing as women’s main pursuit, society does not allocate enough resources to
allow women to achieve other goals).
181. Id. (conveying that women do not always control the circumstances under
which they become pregnant and thus are, in some circumstances, constrained from
pursuing other endeavors).
182. See id. at 1312-13 (stating that society does not adequately provide for women
looking to combine family responsibilities with work outside of the home).
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situated” requirement that leaves issues of procreation unaddressed.183 She
seems to favor legal protections and rights as generally appropriate, but
calls for a change in the way they are applied. It is important, she argues,
for the law to develop a new doctrine with better notions of discrimination,
which should include a much wider notion of disparate impact as
amounting to discrimination.184 As such, the disproportionate harm to
women witnessed in the FMLA would likely constitute sex discrimination.
The facial neutrality is irrelevant; what matters is the gendered effect of the
law. “If sex equality existed . . . the workplace would be organized with
women as much in mind as men; the care of children would be a priority
for adults without respect to gender; women would be able to support
themselves and their families (in whatever form) in dignity through the
work they do.”185
Gender-neutral policies such as the FMLA may represent equality in
law, but not equality in fact. The current state of family life is unjust and
therefore unacceptable, making women unnecessarily vulnerable and
enhancing the existing gendered power dynamic. Susan Moller Okin
writes, in explanation of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, that although
the “modern liberal society . . . is deeply and pervasively genderstructured,” it is not necessarily doomed by this and nevertheless has much
to offer.186 Okin describes a revised version of liberalism, offering up
solutions to lingering problems. She explains that society can never truly
be just if the family, its most basic institution where each individual is
socialized, is unjust.187 She thus attacks the division of labor that makes
marriage and family life so unjust for women.188 A move toward equality
in the family would lighten the disparate burden that many women face
from the FMLA. In her own critique of classical liberalism, Okin takes aim
at liberal theories that fail to take account of women, other than to presume
that they will take care of all the productive, reproductive, and daily service
needs of the private sphere without being vested with any rights of their
own within the public sphere.189 Okin echoes Brown’s claim that the
“good life” is implicitly reserved for men, but is only possible for men as a
183. See id. at 1324 (arguing that the “similarly situated” test is ineffective because
“no man is ever in the same position a woman is, because he is not in it as a woman”).
184. See id. at 1325 (arguing that state law needs to more adequately address not
only obvious discriminatory acts but invidious discrimination as well).
185. Id. at 1326-27.
186. See OKIN, supra note 6, at 89 (claiming that John Rawls’s liberal principles
challenge the role of gender in society but that his theory is underdeveloped).
187. See id. at 99 (stating that if families are not just, then Rawls’s whole structure
of moral development is built on shaky ground).
188. See id. at 100 (providing examples of how family roles are divided by gender).
189. See id. at 108 (arguing that Rawls neglects gender and does not consider
whether the family is a just institution).
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For Okin, this
result of this presumed female subordination.190
public/private dichotomy and the division of labor that it engenders is the
source of the problem. She spends some time demonstrating how the
“personal is political,” and that relegating women to the private sphere
actually oppresses them in all spheres, as dominance and subordination are
continuously circular.191 This is directly relevant to the causes for the
FMLA’s disproportionate harm to women, and speaks to potential ways to
alleviate the problem.
Yet Okin is unwilling to give up the basic tenets of liberalism in her
quest towards equality, believing that liberalism is not inherently flawed,
but is problematic only in the way it has conventionally been applied. This
represents the essential difference between her position and that of
Brown.192 Okin argues strongly that the family should be held to standards
of justice equal to that of the public sphere.193 Justice for women is defined
by complete egalitarianism both at home and in public, and she applies the
principle by reference to equal basic liberty and fair equality of opportunity
both in law and in fact.194
Okin claims, however, that the basic precepts of liberalism are the same
as those of feminism: namely, a belief in fundamental equality of human
beings, with individual freedoms being central.195 As such, feminism and
liberalism can be reconciled. The only way to accomplish this, according
to Okin, is to completely abolish gender in society and reform the family.
Since the family is not inseparably tied to its current gender structure, a real
and complete sharing of all obligations, domestic and public, can eradicate
the dualism existing in liberalism and eliminate gender inequality.196 She
concludes that the family must be reformed to adhere to standards of justice
toward the end of complete egalitarianism.197 Presumably, if such an event
190. See BROWN, supra note 155, at 144 (arguing that in the traditional familial
“division of labor,” where the male works outside the home and the female works
inside the home, the female’s work is undervalued due to its private nature, while the
male’s work is overvalued due to its social and public nature).
191. See OKIN, supra note 6, at 125 (discussing the “interconnections between
women’s domestic roles and their inequality and segregation in the workplace”).
192. See BROWN, supra note 155, at 139 (claiming that Okin criticizes liberalist
theory because of its failure to apply the interest of eliminating the subordination of
women in the economic sphere to the goal of “democratizing” the household sphere).
193. See OKIN, supra note 6, at 126 (claiming that “domestic life needs to be just
and have its justice reinforced by the state and its legal system”).
194. See id. at 171 (arguing that any solution to injustice must encourage equal
sharing by men and women of family responsibilities).
195. See id. at 61 (stating that many of the basic tenets of liberalism are the same as
those of feminism and giving examples).
196. See id. at 172 (claiming that moving away from gender is essential to remaining
true to democratic ideals).
197. See id. at 183 (arguing that families in which roles are equally shared regardless
of sex are the most just).
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were to occur, then gender-neutral public policies would be more
appropriate, provided the FMLA is expanded to provide more thorough
provisions for family responsibilities. It is clear that Okin has high hopes
and expectations for liberalism’s potential in a gender-free society that
upholds the highest standards of justice and equality. As such, she
advocates for a change in liberal thinking, but does so within a liberal
framework and using liberal arguments, the end result being something she
would conceive of as a genuinely liberal society, more true to its own
revered principles.
Therefore, while the FMLA exhibits several serious problems that may
increase gender inequality, simply revising the FMLA to address those
problems, while necessary, is not enough. There are two distinct issues
here: the first problem is that the provisions of the FMLA are too limiting
in terms of coverage requirements, length of leave, and pay. It assumes
and reinforces both a certain amount of employment status and masculine
notions of the ideal worker. This ideal worker either has no family
obligations, or prioritizes work over family, where children’s needs, as well
as personal fulfillment, are sacrificed for economic advantage. Traditional
male breadwinners have been able to do this without much harm, but others
attempting to succeed in employment have a much more difficult time.198
This construction of the “ideal worker” is socially determined, and is not
necessary for successful economic development.199 It results in the
economic marginalization of those with the majority of family obligations,
who are also more likely to be women. There is no inherent reason why a
choice should have to be made between work and family; that is often
presumed to be the case simply because it is how our culture has developed
over time. A conception of the “ideal worker” could be reconstructed to
include workers with ongoing family responsibilities, and productivity need
not suffer as a result. In fact, as statistics reveal, productivity may actually
be increased.200
The second problem is unrelated to the FMLA itself, and is only
peripherally related to the workplace. Rather, it relates to the division of
labor in the “private” sphere that causes the extant laws to hurt women and
the poor more than men and the wealthy. This creates a circular problem
whereby women’s greater burdens at home make them less able to succeed
in the workforce, and women’s lack of success in the workforce make it
198. See KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 154, at 11-12 (arguing that the use of
traditional gender roles has been used to justify workplace discrimination and
decreased workforce positions for women).
199. See id. at 5.
200. Patricia A. Roos, Book Review, 16 GENDER & SOC’Y 570, 570-71 (2002)
(reviewing JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000)).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2008

39

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 4 [2008], Art. 2

498

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 16:4

more likely that women will bear the burdens at home. This is why writing
the FMLA to apply to women and men equally still hurts women—their
extra burdens at home have not changed, but their legal rights and
protections are the same as for those who have never had significant family
responsibilities to limit them.
B. Solutions
An important question remains whether, in the attempt to achieve true
gender equality, which to date remains elusive, liberalism should be
rejected or embraced, or perhaps accepted but modified. Certainly,
changes to the FMLA are needed in order to take account of the realities of
caregiving responsibilities in our society and their gendered nature. The
law needs to be expanded to provide further protections, including paid
leaves, wider scope of coverage for businesses and employees, coverage
for minor illness, coverage for extended family, and lengthier leave. This
approach is a liberal one, relying on legal protections to uphold individual
rights; yet it starts to move away from liberalism when one considers that
the “rights” being protected are less about individualism, self-government,
and autonomy, than they are about family responsibilities, social
connections, and the overlap between the public and private. These legal
changes must be incorporated in ways that take account of socially
constructed gender and power difference, rather than simply pretending
that facial equality equals real equality. The FMLA cannot equalize the
gender imbalance simply by applying to both genders. This, in effect,
purports to solve societal harms that are gender-specific by enacting
protections and rights that are gender-neutral, and therefore unable to
address the harms fully. This argument again moves away from a
liberalism which presumes that facial equality is all that is needed for
justice. The approach advocated here rejects the value of facial equality as
the sole determinant of justice, and instead requires a more nuanced
discussion of societal norms and impositions as they play out across
groups. These inequalities are not legally imposed, but socially; yet that
fact does not make them any less real or harmful. If inequality itself is a
problem, why should only legal inequality matter?
Therefore, in addition to expanding upon the FMLA, a revamping of
gendered family life and the division of labor at home is necessary to afford
women the full autonomy in the public sphere that men have enjoyed.
There is nothing inherent in a liberal political system that requires an
unequal and gendered division of labor (whereby it will almost always be
women doing the work that is private, unrecognized, and devalued); true
equality at home is possible within a liberal framework. Yet this approach
also necessarily entails the elimination of the (ostensible) public/private
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divide that relegates the private realm to obscurity and non-importance, and
considers it beyond the concerns of justice. Feminists have pointed out that
this divide is a myth in any case, masking the reality of our socio-political
system whereby certain “private” issues are in fact regulated by the state—
most notably marriage, divorce, and child custody laws.201 In effect, the
state does not simply stay out of the private realm, but actually decides
which private issues it will regulate. Thus, while the elimination of the
public/private divide appears to be a revision of liberal public policy, it is
not such a drastic change as it might first appear to be. While the private
realm already overlaps with the public realm in many respects, what this
approach will entail is a recognition and admission of that fact. Bringing
the private into the public will lead to greater valuing of familial and
caregiving responsibilities and the recognition of a general societal interest
in these values. It will not mean that the state steps in to regulate every
aspect of peoples’ private lives that have traditionally been up to
individuals to decide for themselves. Rather, it will mean that notions of
justice and fairness apply in the home as much as they do in public, and
that injustice in one realm leads to and reinforces injustice in the other.
Until family and home life are truly equal, gender-neutrality in public—as
represented in laws such as the FMLA—is insufficient and misguided.
The desired result can be obtained while maintaining liberalism’s core
principles, such as autonomy, justice, and self-government. Yet the liberal
notion of “individuality” is more dubious. In effect, individuality is less
about freedom of self-government than it is about the “freedom” to sink or
swim, regardless of what social forces are already working against you. It
is unclear why this type of severe individuality is necessary within a liberal
framework. It seems reasonable to suggest that a liberal theory involves
autonomy, justice, and self-government, and rather than individuality, a
social connectedness recognizing a societal stake in individual as well as
family success. Liberalism need not necessarily exclude such community
or group attachments, although they have not typically been found there.
Although liberalism has tended to ignore the family (except to dictate what
rights women have within marriage), it depends upon it in order to function
properly. Given this dependence, then, family responsibilities should
receive much greater emphasis and support. Perhaps this has not yet
happened because women still bear the majority of responsibilities. If men
contributed equally to family life, it is more likely that society would place
higher value on such responsibility and would thus institute policies
accounting for public subjects (like employees) who have familial
201. See OKIN, supra note 6, at 129 (declaring that there is no clear distinction
between areas of life that are public and subject to state regulation, and areas of life that
are private).
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responsibilities and interests. Recognition of the value of this behavior is
necessary before public policy is likely to shift in that direction. Liberalism
no longer needs to depend upon the subjection of half of its citizens so that
the other half can achieve the ideal.
One might wonder how far we can push liberal principles while still
calling the end result “liberalism.” Yet the real issue is not so much
whether we call it “liberalism” or something else, but rather what it looks
like in terms of policy, and whether it will be accepted by a society that
was founded upon certain liberal principles. Our entire political, legal, and
constitutional structure is so embedded within liberalism that it may be
exceedingly difficult for us to truly escape it without a complete revolution
of our socio-political structure. Strategically speaking, then, some liberal
values would thus need to be maintained in order for change to be allowed
to happen. Yet what is truly necessary need not be sacrificed for political
practicality; most of liberalism’s core values can be maintained toward the
end of gender equality, as discussed above. A de-emphasis on the divide
between public and private, as well as on the value of “individualism,” is
necessary to achieve it.
V. CONCLUSION
In a society where 78% of families have both parents working outside
the home for pay, and where single-parent families are more common than
ever, it is critical that social and legal policy recognize the need for familyfriendly policies and workplaces that allow parents and other caregivers to
meet their familial responsibilities without sacrificing their public lives and
livelihoods.202 Our current laws and policies, which notably include the
FMLA as a law designed to address that very problem, fall far short of
meeting the need that exists; they still largely presume a male breadwinner
employee that has little to no private responsibilities, which while generally
untrue for women, may be less and less true for men as well. Sociallyimposed norms and responsibilities differ based on gender, which means
that the limits of the FMLA affect women more harshly. As such, the law
may actually “exacerbate inequalities it could diminish.”203 Classical
liberal ideas play into this problem by enforcing a mythical divide between
public and private life that devalues the “private” realm of family, and
202. See JODI GRANT, TAYLOR HATCHER & NIRALI PATEL, NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP
FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, EXPECTING BETTER: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF
PARENTAL LEAVE PROGRAMS 2 (2005) (utilizing this data to argue that the workplace is

out of touch with reality in the United States because many employers do not provide,
nor does the federal government require, paid leave for new parents).
203. See GERSTEL & MCGONAGLE, supra note 80, at 528 (noting, however, that the
data used could not show how the FMLA independently affected parental leave, given
that other factors would also affect the rate).
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emphasizes individualist ideals of self-help that ignore society’s interest in
family stability. In the words of Gerstel & McGonagle: “gender-neutral
state policy can reinforce gender inequality of the wider social context,
consisting of gender inequality in family caregiving as well as in material
opportunities and rewards . . . .”204 Liberal theory must take account of this
fact and reject the prevailing presumption that facial neutrality alone
constitutes justice. Instead, liberal theory must incorporate ideals and
policy that more fully and effectively result in equal opportunity.

204. See id. at 529 (pointing out that returning to work can often be more comforting
and stress reducing than staying at home to care for a new child).
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